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ABSTRACT
We consider game theory from the perspective of quantum algorithms. Strategies in clas-
sical game theory are either pure (deterministic) or mixed (probabilistic). We introduce
these basic ideas in the context of a simple example, closely related to the traditional
MATCHING PENNIES game. While not every two-person zero-sum finite game has an
equilibrium in the set of pure strategies, von Neumann showed that there is always an
equilibrium at which each player follows a mixed strategy. A mixed strategy deviating
from the equilibrium strategy cannot increase a player’s expected payoff. We show, how-
ever, that in our example a player who implements a quantum strategy can increase his
expected payoff, and explain the relation to efficient quantum algorithms. We prove that
in general a quantum strategy is always at least as good as a classical one, and furthermore
that when both players use quantum strategies there need not be any equilibrium, but if
both are allowed mixed quantum strategies there must be.
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Attention to the physical representation of information underlies the recent theories
of quantum computation, quantum cryptography and quantum communication. In each
case representation in a quantum system provides advantages over the classical situation:
Simon’s quantum algorithm to identify the period of a function chosen by an oracle is more
efficient than any deterministic or probabilistic algorithm [1] and provided the foundation
for Shor’s polynomial time quantum algorithm for factoring [2]. The quantum protocols
for key distribution devised by Wiener, Bennett and Brassard, and Ekert are qualitatively
more secure against eavesdropping than any classical cryptosystem [3]. And Cleve and
Buhrman, and van Dam, Høyer and Tapp have shown that prior quantum entanglement
reduces communication complexity [4]. In this report we add game theory to the list:
quantum strategies can be more successful than classical ones.
While this result may seem obscure or surprising, in fact it is neither. Cryptographic
situations, for example, are readily conceived as games; it is reasonable to ask if the
advantages of quantum key distribution generalize. Game theory, on the other hand, seems
to beg for a quantum version: Classical strategies can be pure or mixed; the correspondence
of this nomenclature, due to von Neumann [5], with that of quantum mechanics is surely
no accident [6]. Furthermore, games against nature, originally studied by Milnor [7],
should include those for which nature is quantum mechanical. Finally, in their extensive
form, games are represented by ‘trees’ [5], just as are (quantum) algorithms [1,8]. We will
exploit this similarity to analyze the effectiveness of quantum strategies, exemplified in the
following very simple game:
PQ PENNY FLIP: The starship Enterprise is facing some immanent—and apparently
inescapable—calamity when Q appears on the bridge and offers to help, provided Cap-
tain Picard∗ can beat him at penny flipping: Picard is to place a penny head up in a
box, whereupon they will take turns (Q, then Picard, then Q) flipping the penny (or not),
without being able to see it. Q wins if the penny is head up when they open the box.
This is a two-person zero-sum strategic game which might be analyzed traditionally
using the payoff matrix:
NN NF FN FF
N −1 1 1 −1
F 1 −1 −1 1
where the rows and columns are labelled by Picard’s and Q’s pure strategies, respectively;
F denotes a flip and N denotes no flip; and the numbers in the matrix are Picard’s
payoffs: 1 indicating a win and −1 a loss.† For example, consider the top entry in the
second column: Q’s strategy is to flip the penny on his first turn and then not flip it on
∗ Captain Picard and Q are characters in the popular American television (and movie) series Star Trek:
The Next Generation whose initials and abilities are ideal for this illustration. See [9].
† Since when one player wins, the other loses, we need only list one player’s payoffs; whenever this
is the case the game is called zero-sum. Strategic refers to the fact that the players choose their
strategies independently of the other player’s actions [10,5].
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his second, while Picard’s strategy is to not flip the penny on his turn. The result is that
the state of the penny is, successively: H, T , T , T , so Picard wins.
Having studied game theory in his Advanced Decision Making course at Starfleet
Academy, Captain Picard has no difficulty determining his optimal strategy: Suppose he
doesn’t flip the penny. Then if Q flips it an even number of times, Picard loses. Similarly,
if Picard flips the penny, then if Q flips it only once, Picard loses. Thus PQ PENNY FLIP
has no deterministic solution [5], no deterministic Nash equilibrium [11]: there is no pair
of pure strategies, one for each player, such that neither player can improve his result by
changing his strategy while the other player does not. But, as von Neumann proved there
must be [10,5], since this is a two-person zero-sum strategic game with only a finite number
of strategies, there is a probabilistic solution: It is easy to check that the pair of mixed
strategies consisting of Picard flipping the penny with probability 1
2
and Q playing each
of his four strategies with probability 1
4
is a probabilistic Nash equilibrium: neither player
can improve his expected payoff (which is 0 in this case) by changing the probabilities with
which he plays each of his pure strategies while the other player does not.
Figuring his chances of winning are 1/2, Captain Picard agrees to play. But he loses.
The rules of the game allow Q two moves so, although his analysis indicates no benefit
for Q from the second move, Picard tries arguing that they should therefore play several
times. To his surprise Q agrees—and proceeds to beat Picard the next 9 times as well.
Picard is sure that Q is cheating. Is he?
H T
↑ րտ ↑
H T
↑ րտ ↑
H T
↑ ր
H
Figure 1. PQ PENNY FLIP in extensive form.
To understand what Q is doing, let
us reanalyze PQ PENNY FLIP in terms
of the sequence of moves—in its extensive
form. Conventionally the extensive form
of a game is illustrated by a tree with a
distinct vertex for each partial sequence
of player actions and outgoing edges from
each vertex corresponding to the possible
actions on the next move. For our pur-
poses it is more useful to study the quo-
tient of this tree obtained by identifying the vertices at which both the state of the game
and the number of preceding moves are the same. Thus we illustrate the extensive form
of PQ PENNY FLIP, not with a binary tree of height 3, but with the directed graph shown
in Figure 1. The vertices are labelled H or T according to the state of the penny and each
diagonal arrow represents a flip while each vertical arrow represents no flip.
Now it is natural to define a two dimensional vector space V with basis {H, T} and
to represent player strategies by sequences of 2× 2 matrices. That is, the matrices
F :=
(H T
H 0 1
T 1 0
)
and N :=
(H T
H 1 0
T 0 1
)
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correspond to flipping and not flipping the penny, respectively, since we define them to act
by left multiplication on the vector representing the state of the penny. A mixed action is
a convex linear combination of F and N , which acts as a 2× 2 (doubly) stochastic matrix:
( H T
H 1− p p
T p 1− p
)
if the player flips the penny with probability p ∈ [0, 1]. A sequence of mixed actions puts
the state of the penny into a convex linear combination aH + (1− a)T , 0 ≤ a ≤ 1, which
means that if the box is opened the penny will be head up with probability a.
Q, however, is eponymously utilizing a quantum strategy, namely a sequence of uni-
tary, rather than stochastic, matrices. In standard Dirac notation [12] the basis of V is
written {|H〉, |T 〉}. A pure quantum state for the penny is a linear combination a|H〉+b|T 〉,
a, b ∈ C, aa + bb = 1, which means that if the box is opened, the penny will be head up
with probability aa. Since the penny starts in state |H〉, this is the state of the penny if
Q’s first action is the unitary operation
U1 = U(a, b) :=
(H T
H a b
T b −a
)
.
Recall that Captain Picard is also living up to his initials, utilizing a classical probabil-
istic strategy in which he flips the penny with probability p. After his action the penny
is in a mixed quantum state, i.e., it is in the pure state b|H〉 + a|T 〉 with probability p
and in the pure state a|H〉 + b|T 〉 with probability 1 − p. Mixed states are conveniently
represented as density matrices [6], elements of V ⊗ V † with trace 1; the diagonal entry
(i, i) is the probability that the system is observed to be in state |i〉. The density matrix
for a pure state |ψ〉 ∈ V is the projection matrix |ψ〉〈ψ| and the density matrix for a mixed
state is the corresponding convex linear combination of pure density matrices. Unitary
transformations act on density matrices by conjugation: The penny starts in the pure
state ρ0 = |H〉〈H| and Q’s first action puts it into the pure state:
ρ1 = U1ρ0U
†
1
=
(
aa ab
ba bb
)
.
Picard’s mixed action acts on this density matrix, not as a stochastic matrix on a proba-
bilistic state, but as a convex linear combination of unitary (deterministic) transformations:
ρ2 = pFρ1F
† + (1− p)Nρ1N † =
(
pbb+ (1− p)aa pba+ (1− p)ab
pab+ (1− p)ba paa+ (1− p)bb
)
. (1)
For p = 1
2
the diagonal elements of ρ2 are each
1
2
. If the game were to end here, Picard’s
strategy would ensure him an expected payoff of 0, independently of Q’s strategy. In fact,
4
Quantum strategies David A. Meyer
if Q were to employ any strategy for which aa 6= bb, Picard could obtain an expected payoff
of |aa− bb| > 0 by setting p = 0, 1 according to whether bb > aa, or the reverse. Similarly,
if Picard were to choose p 6= 1
2
, Q could obtain an expected payoff of |2p − 1| by setting
a = 1 or b = 1 according to whether p < 1
2
, or the reverse. Thus the mixed/quantum
equilibria for the two-move game are pairs
(
[ 1
2
F + 1
2
N ], [U(a, b)]
)
for which aa = 1
2
= bb
and the outcome is the same as if both players utilize optimal mixed strategies.
But Q has another move U3 which again transforms the state of the penny by con-
jugation to ρ3 = U3ρ2U
†
3
. If Q’s strategy consists of U1 = U(1/
√
2, 1/
√
2) = U3, his first
action puts the penny into a simultaneous eigenvalue 1 eigenstate of both F and N , which
is therefore invariant under any mixed strategy pF + (1− p)N of Picard; and his second
action inverts his first to give ρ3 = |H〉〈H|. That is, with probability 1 the penny is head
up! Since Q can do no better than to win with probability 1, this is an optimal quantum
strategy for him. All the pairs
(
[pF + (1 − p)N ], [U(1/√2, 1/√2), U(1/√2, 1/√2)]) are
mixed/quantum equilibria for PQ PENNY FLIP, with value −1 to Picard; this is why he
loses every game.
PQ PENNY FLIP is a very simple game, but it is structurally similar to the oracle
problems for which efficient quantum algorithms are known—with Picard playing the role
of the oracle. In Simon’s problem the functions f : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}n which satisfy f(x) =
f(y) if and only if y = x⊕s for some s ∈ {0, 1}n (⊕ denotes componentwise addition, mod
2), correspond to Picard’s pure strategies; we may imagine the oracle choosing a mixed
strategy intended to minimize our chances of efficiently determining s probabilistically.
Simon’s algorithm is a quantum strategy which is more successful than any mixed, i.e.,
probabilistic, one [1]. Similarly, in the problem of searching a database of size N , the
locations in the database correspond to pure strategies; again we may imagine the oracle
choosing a mixed strategy designed to frustrate our search for an item at some specified
location. Grover’s algorithm is a quantum strategy for a game of 2m moves alternating
between us and the oracle, where m = O(
√
N), which out performs any mixed strategy
[13]. These three examples suggest the following:
THEOREM 1: There is always a mixed/quantum equilibrium for a two-person zero-sum
game, at which the expected payoff for the player utilizing a quantum strategy is at least
as great as his expected payoff with an optimal mixed strategy.
Proof (sketch): A sequence of mixed actions puts the game into a convex linear combina-
tion
∑
pi|i〉 of pure states. If one of the players utilizes a quantum strategy, the state of
the game is described instead by a density matrix. We must show that there is always a
quantum strategy which reproduces the pi as the diagonal elements in the density matrix.
Assume by induction that this is true up to a move of the classical player. His action
has the same effect on the diagonal elements of the density matrix as it does on the pi in
the original mixed/mixed equilibrium move sequence. (See (1).) All that remains to be
shown is that a single action of the quantum player can be chosen to reproduce the effect
of a mixed action. It is only necessary to consider U(2) actions on a general 2× 2 density
matrix. If the phase of the (1, 2) element in the density matrix is γ, a straightforward
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calculation verifies that the unitary matrix U(epi/2−γ
√
p,
√
1− p) reproduces the effect of
the mixed action pF + (1− p)N on the diagonal elements.
Of course, the more interesting question is for which games there is a quantum strategy
which improves upon the optimal mixed strategy. By the analogy with algorithms, this
is essentially the fundamental question of which problems can be solved more efficiently
by quantum algorithms than by classical ones. We may hope that the game theoretic
perspective will suggest new possibilities for efficient quantum algorithms.
Another natural question to ask is what happens if both players utilize quantum
strategies. By considering PQ PENNY FLIP we can prove the following:
THEOREM 2: A two-person zero-sum game need not have a quantum/quantum equilibrium.
Proof : Consider an arbitrary pair of quantum strategies ([U2], [U1, U3]) for PQ PENNY
FLIP. Suppose U3U2U1|H〉 6= |H〉. Then Q can improve his expected payoff (to 1) by
changing his strategy, replacing U3 with U
−1
1
U−1
2
, which is unitary since U1 and U2 are.
Similarly, suppose U3U2U1|H〉 6= |T 〉. Then Picard can improve his expected payoff (to 1)
by changing his strategy, replacing U2 with U
−1
3
FU−1
1
, which is unitary since each of U1,
U3 and F is. Since U3U2U1|H〉 cannot be both |H〉 and |T 〉, at least one of the players
can improve his expected payoff by changing his strategy while the other does not. Thus
([U2], [U1, U3]) cannot be an equilibrium, for any U1, U2, U3, so PQ PENNY FLIP has no
quantum/quantum equilibrium.
That is, the situation when both players utilize quantum strategies is the same as
when they both utilize pure (classical) strategies: there need not be any equilibrium solu-
tion. This suggests looking for the analogue of von Neumann’s result on the existence of
mixed strategy equilibria [10,5]. So we should consider strategies which are convex linear
combinations of unitary actions—mixed quantum strategies.
THEOREM 3: A two-person zero-sum game always has a mixed quantum/mixed quantum
equilibrium.
Proof : Since mixed quantum actions form a convex compact subset of a finite dimensional
vector space, this is an immediate corollary of Glicksberg’s generalization [14] of Nash’s
proof [15] for the existence of game equilibria.
Finally, we remark that while decoherence precludes the play of PQ PENNY FLIP with
a penny, only a two state quantum system is logically necessary. Thus each of the physical
systems in which quantum gate operations have been demonstrated—QED cavities [16],
ion traps [17] and NMR machines [18]—could be used to realize games of PQ PENNY FLIP
and even slightly more complicated games with quantum strategies.
Acknowledgements
I thank Ian Agol, Thad Brown, Mike Freedman, Jeong Han Kim, Jeff Remmel and Francis
6
Quantum strategies David A. Meyer
Zane for discussions about this work.
References
[1] D. R. Simon, “On the power of quantum computation”, in S. Goldwasser, ed., Pro-
ceedings of the 35th Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science, Santa Fe, NM,
20–22 November 1994 (Los Alamitos, CA: IEEE Computer Society Press 1994) 116–
123.
[2] P. W. Shor, “Algorithms for quantum computation: discrete logarithms and factor-
ing”, in S. Goldwasser, ed., Proceedings of the 35th Symposium on Foundations of
Computer Science, Santa Fe, NM, 20–22 November 1994 (Los Alamitos, CA: IEEE
Computer Society Press 1994) 124–134.
[3] S. Wiesner, “Conjugate coding”, SIGACT News 15 (1983) 78–88;
C. H. Bennett and G. Brassard, “Quantum cryptography: Public-key distribution and
coin tossing”, in Proceedings of the IEEE International Conference on Computers,
Systems and Signal Processing, Bangalore, India, December 1984 (New York: IEEE
1984) 175–179;
A. Ekert, “Quantum cryptography based on Bell’s theorem”, Phys. Rev. Lett. 67
(1991) 661–663.
[4] R. Cleve and H. Buhrman, “Substituting quantum entanglement for communication”,
Phys. Rev. A 56 (1997) 1201–1204;
W. van Dam, P. Høyer and A. Tapp, “Multiparty quantum communication complex-
ity”, preprint (1997), quant-ph/9710054.
[5] J. von Neumann and O. Morgenstern, Theory of Games and Economic Behavior, third
edition (Princeton: Princeton University Press 1953).
[6] J. von Neumann, Mathematische Grundlagen der Quantenmechanik (Berlin: Spring-
er-Verlag 1932); transl. by R. T. Beyer as Mathematical Foundations of Quantum
Mechanics (Princeton: Princeton University Press 1955).
[7] J. Milnor, “Games against nature”, in R. M. Thrall, C. H. Coombs and R. L. Davis,
eds., Decision Processes (New York: John Wiley & Sons 1954) 49–59.
[8] E. Farhi and S. Gutmann, “Quantum computation and decision trees”, MIT preprint
CTP-2651 (1997), quant-ph/9706062.
[9] L. M. Krauss, The Physics of Star Trek, with a forword by Stephen Hawking (New
York: HarperCollins 1995).
[10] J. von Neumann, “Zur theorie der gesellschaftsspiele”, Math. Ann. 100 (1928) 295–
320.
[11] J. F. Nash, “Equilibrium points in N -person games”, Proc. Nat. Acad. Sci. U.S.A. 36
(1950) 48–49.
[12] P. A. M. Dirac, The Principles of Quantum Mechanics, fourth edition (Oxford: Oxford
University Press 1958).
[13] L. K. Grover, “A fast quantum mechanical algorithm for database search”, in Proceed-
ings of the 28th Annual ACM Symposium on the Theory of Computing, Philadelphia,
PA, 22–24 May 1996 (New York: ACM 1996) 212–219.
[14] I. L. Glicksberg, “A further generalization of the Kakutani fixed point theorem, with
application to Nash equilibrium points”, Proc. Amer. Math. Soc. 3 (1952) 170–174.
7
Quantum strategies David A. Meyer
[15] J. F. Nash, “Non-cooperative games”, Advances in Math. 54 (1951) 286–295.
[16] Q. A. Turchette, C. J. Hood. W. Lange, H. Mabuchi and H. J. Kimble, “Measurement
of conditional phase shifts for quantum logic”, Phys. Rev. Lett. 75 (1995) 4710–4713.
[17] J. I. Cirac and P. Zoller, “Quantum computation with cold trapped ions”, Phys. Rev.
Lett. 74 (1995) 4091–4094;
C. Monroe, D. M. Meekhof, B. E. King, W. M. Itano and D. J. Wineland, “Demon-
stration of a fundamental logic gate”, Phys. Rev. Lett. 75 (1995) 4714–4717.
[18] D. G. Cory, M. D. Price, A. F. Fahmy and T. F. Havel, “Nuclear magnetic resonance
spectroscopy: an experimentally accessible paradigm for quantum computing”, quant-
ph/9709001;
I. L. Chuang, N. Gershenfeld, M. G. Kubinec and D. W. Leung, “Bulk quantum
computation with nuclear magnetic resonance: theory and experiment”, Proc. Roy.
Soc. Lond. A 454 (1998) 447–467.
8
